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Robert J. Barro 
University  of Rochester 
Martin  Feldstein  and  James  Buchanan  have  raised  a  number  of  critical 
points  concerning  my  government-debt  paper.  For  the  reasons  detailed 
below,  I  believe  that  my  central  thesis  has  not  been  impaired  by  these 
criticisms. 
I.  Feldstein 
Feldstein's  comment  deals  with  my  conclusion  that  government  debt 
(and  social  security)  will  not  add  to net  wealth  in a model  with  operative 
intergenerational  transfers  (either  from  old  to  young  or  from  young  to 
old).  He  accepts  this conclusion  in the case  of a static  economy,  but argues 
that  it is  incorrect  when  the  economy  is  growing.  It  is important  to  dis- 
tinguish  two  cases-the  first  in  which  the  growth  rate,  g  (the  sum  of 
population  growth  and  growth  in  real  income  per  head),  is  below  the 
steady-state  (real)  rate  of  return,  r;  and  the  second  where  g  >  r.1 The 
first case  is straightforward  and  turns  out  to  require  no  modifications  to 
my  previous  results.  Feldstein's  contrary  conclusion  is  the  result  of  an 
error in calculating  present  values  of future  tax liabilities.  The  second  case 
is  both  more  interesting  and  more  difficult,  and  I  present  some  analysis 
of it below. 
Suppose  that  the  economy  is in  a steady  state  with  output  growing  at 
rate g. The  (real)  rate  of return  is constant  and  equal  to r. Consider,  first, 
the  case  in  which  r  >  g.  In  this  situation  Feldstein  (pp.  333-334)  con- 
siders  the  impact  of  government  debt  that  grows  at  rate  g,  so  that  the 
ratio of debt  to income  remains  constant  over time.2  He argues,  ".  . . some 
1 Feldstein also deals with a third case where the gross-of-tax rate of return is above g, 
but the net-of-tax  rate is below g. Since  the main  purpose of this case is to make more 
plausible the situation where g is at least as large as the net rate of return, it is not necessary 
for me to deal with it separately. 
2  The  limitation  of the steady-state growth rate of the public  debt to g can be ration- 
alized by assuming that the value of the outstanding stock of debt at any point in time is 
bounded by the government's collateral, which I assume can be measured by the present 
value of future taxing capacity.  If taxes are limited to a fraction,  T, of national income,y, 
then  the  present  value,  calculated  at  the  current  date  t,  of  future  taxing  capacity  is 
y(t)1(r  -  g)  =  zy(O)egt/(r  -  g). Hence, the government's  collateral  grows  at rate  g and 
is finite for any t if r >  g. If government  debt grew at a rate faster than g, then the out- 
standing stock would eventually  exceed  the government's collateral. 
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future  taxes  would  have  to  be  levied  to  limit  the  growth  of  the  govern- 
ment  debt.  ...  For example,  if  ...  the  debt  growls]  at the  rate of growth 
of  the  economy,  taxes  will  be  required  to  finance  only  the  fraction 
[1  -  g/r] of future interest  payments"  (p. 332).  The  last statement  is correct 
but  does  not imply  his conclusion  that  "only  in  the  special  case  of a static 
economy  (g  =  0)  is  the  present  value  of  required  future  taxes  equal  to 
the  present  value  of  the  debt  itself"  (p.  333).  The  fallacy  is  that  the 
fraction,  (1  -  g/r),  applies  to a base  that is larger  (increasingly  over time) 
than  it  would  have  been  if  the  debt  had  remained  constant  rather  than 
growing  at rate g. 
Consider  an initial  debt  issue  of amount  B (0)  and  a path  of subsequent 
issues  that  make  the  outstanding  stock  of  debt  grow  at  rate  g.  Hence, 
B (t)  B (O)egt, and  the  amount  of  debt  finance  at  any  date  t  >  0  is 
dB/dt  =  gB (t).  Taxes  levied  at  date  t are  the  amount  needed  to  finance 
interest  payments  net  of debt  finance,  rB (t)  -  gB (t).  The  present  value 
of these  future  taxes,  discounted  at rate  r, is 
(r  -  g)B(t)ert  dt  =  (r  -  g)B(0)  e-(r-g)t  dt  =  B(0). 
Hence,  as would  be  expected,  the  present  value  of the  future  taxes  coin- 
cides  with  the  amount  of  the  initial  debt  issue  for any  growth  rate  g  (as 
long  as g  <  r).  Therefore,  the  presence  of growth  in  the  economy  (at  a 
rate  below  r)  leaves  unchanged  the  conclusion  that  government  bonds 
are  not  net  wealth. 
Consider,  now,  the second  case  where  r  <  g.  (The  situation  with  r  <  g 
in a steady  state  implies  inefficient  capital  overaccumulation,  as discussed 
in  Phelps  [1966].)  In  this  case  it  is  possible  to  finance  all  of  the  future 
interest  payments  without  incurring  any  future  taxes  by  having  the  debt 
grow  forever3  at  rate  r.4 In  this  situation,  where  r  <  g in  a steady  state, 
it  appears  that  debt  issue  would  be  regarded  as  net  wealth  and  would 
therefore  raise  aggregate  demand.  Further,  it  seems  that  a  sufficient 
amount  of debt  issue  would  cause  enough  of  a shift  from  saving  to  con- 
sumption  so that  the  steady-state  rate  of return  would  be  raised  to  (just) 
exceed  the  growth  rate. 
3 In  one  respect this possibility  hinges  on  an  infinite  horizon-any  finite  truncation 
(corresponding, say, to a fixed date for the end of the world or to an exogenous liquidation 
date  for the  debt)  would  restore equality  between  the  present  value  of  taxes  and  the 
amount of initial debt. On the other hand, an individual's effective horizon for capitalizing 
taxes would  also not be infinite if intergenerational  transfers were not  (expected  to be) 
operative for some generations far in the future. In this sense it is the relative values of the 
horizons for the world and the individual  that are important,  rather than whether either 
is infinite. A further consideration,  pointed  out by Starrett (1970),  is that the end of the 
world, if it is anticipated, is presumably stochastic. Starrett argues (p. 709) that a stochastic 
end of the world is equivalent  to an infinite horizon with an appropriate specification of 
the discount rate applied  to future utilities. 
4  The  debt  could  also grow at rates above  r to finance  a continuing  flow of transfer 
payments.  The government's collateral,  as calculated  in n. 2 above, is now infinite. COMMUNICATIONS  345 
The  important  issue  is whether  the  economy  would  ever  be in  a steady 
state  where  r  <  g.  The  reason  that  government  debt  issue  can  move  the 
economy  out  of  this  situation  is  that  the  government's  collateral,  which 
grows  at rate g over an infinite  horizon  (see n. 2), allows  the debt  to expand 
forever  at  rates  at  least  equal  to  r. Are  there  any  private  individuals  or 
institutions  that  would  have  a  similar  capacity  and  incentive  in  the 
absence  of  government  intervention?  In  the  overlapping-generations 
models  of  Diamond  (1965)  and  Cass  and  Yaari  (1967),  there  are  no 
economic  units  with  a sufficiently  long  time  perspective  to engage  in  this 
type  of activity,  so that  a competitive  equilibrium  with  r  <  g in  a steady 
state  is  possible.  On  the  other  hand,  in  a  model  of  a utility-maximizing 
immortal  family,  as  in  Sidrauski  (1967),  the  solution  with  r  <  g  in  a 
steady  state  would  be  untenable.  In  this  situation  the  family  would  be 
motivated  to  play  the  same  game  as  the  government  by  issuing  debts  in 
exchange  for  current  consumption,  financing  these  debts  by  allowing 
them  to  grow  at  a rate  at  least  equal  to  r but  not  higher  than  g-a  rate 
that  would  not  exceed  the  growth  rate  of  the  family's  collateral  and 
thereby  never  reducing  future  consumption.5  Hence,  a  competitive 
equilibrium  would  have  to  be  in  the  (efficient)  region  where  r  >  g  in  a 
steady  state.  In  a  situation  with  finite-lived  individuals,  it  seems  that 
operative  intergenerational  transfers  would  play  an  equivalent  role.  In 
particular,  when  r  <  g  in  a steady  state,  transfer  payments  from  young 
to old  (which  I referred  to  as arising  from  a  "gift  motive"  in  my  earlier 
paper)  that  grow  at a rate  at least  equal  to r but  not  higher  than  g would 
be  feasible  in  the  sense  that  the  ratio  of  transfers  to  income  would  not 
grow  over  time  and  would  raise  at  least  the  present  consumption  level 
without  reducing  any  future  levels  of  consumption.6  It  seems  that  the 
operation  of  these  types  of  transfers  would  insure  that  a  competitive 
equilibrium  is in  the  (efficient)  region  where  r  >  g in  a steady  state.  My 
main  hesitancy  about  this conclusion  is that  I have  been  unable  to demon- 
strate  that  the  transfer  scheme,  which  can  feasibly  raise  the  consumption 
level  of all  family  members  (living  in finite  time)  if r  <  g, would  be  con- 
sistent  with  utility  maximization  as  viewed  by  each  family  member 
separately.  (Hopefully,  Brock  and  Scheinkman,  well-known  experts  on 
the  economics  of infinity,  will  provide  a final  resolution  of this  question.) 
Accordingly,  at this point  I cannot  rigorously  rule  out the  existence  of the 
case,  r  <  g,  in  which  debt  issue  would  raise  net  wealth.  Nevertheless,  I 
5 Thompson  (1967,  p.  1205)  claims  that  a  corporate  firm,  which  has  an  infinite  legal 
life,  would  be  motivated  to  carry  out  similar  policies.  However,  I  cannot  see  why  this 
policy  is  generally  feasible,  since  the  firm's  collateral  would  not  automatically  grow  at 
rate  g;  presumably,  its  net  earnings  are  not  a  fixed  fraction  of  national  income. 
6  Reductions  of  bequests  from  old  to  young  would  have  an  equivalent  effect,  but  it 
seems  that  bequests  would  not  be  operative  in  a  steady  state  where  r  <  g,  at  least  if 
bequests  are  motivated  solely  by  concern  for  the  utility  of  descendants  (and  assuming 
preference  for  a  unit  of  own  consumption  over  that  of  a  descendant,  starting  at  equal 
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would be surprised if many advocates of standard fiscal policy would be 
happy to rest the argument for the efficacy of such policy on the possible 
existence of this case. 
Finally, Feldstein observes near the end of his comment that the effect 
of government bond issue  on  future generations is  complicated  and  is 
therefore likely to be neglected by current generations. It is plausible that 
computational difficulties would add to individual uncertainty, and the 
model could be usefully supplemented to make that uncertainty explicit. 
However, it is much less clear that this complication would imply sys- 
tematic errors in a direction such that public debt issue raises aggregate 
demand.  One  could  argue at  the same level  of rigor that government 
deficits make  people  sufficiently nervous  to  reduce  their  consumption 
demand when taxes are replaced by public debt issue. As a general point 
it is difficult to identify a substitute for rational behavior as a basis for 
forming predictions in theoretical models. 
II.  Buchanan 
Buchanan begins his comment by pointing out my failure to acknowledge 
an intellectual  debt  to  David  Ricardo.  I  readily  accept  this criticism, 
although it has no substantive bearing on my results. 
I  should indicate,  first, that  my  analysis was  directed  toward fiscal 
operations that involve shifts between tax and debt finance for a given 
volume of public expenditures. Shifts in the expenditure level have real 
effects that depend on the degree of substitutability between public and 
private expenditures in individual utility functions (Bailey 1971, chap. 9) 
and  on  the  direct  productivity  of public  expenditures  (Grossman and 
Lucas 1974), and it did not seem necessary to become involved in these 
issues. 
Concerning a public debt issue that corresponds to either a  transfer 
payment  or  a  lump-sum  tax  cut,  Buchanan  states,  ".  . . persons  who  pur- 
chase  these  bonds  must  draw  down  private  investments  or reduce  private 
consumption."  This  assertion  is  incorrect  since,  as  a  matter  of  a  budget 
constraint,  the  (representative)  individual  can  use  the  full  amount  of his 
transfer  payment  (tax  reduction)  to  just  purchase  the  bonds;  the  issue 
is whether,  in  fact,  individuals  will  be  motivated  to save  the  full  amount 
of  their  increased  disposable  resources.  Buchanan  then  says,  ".  . .  it  is 
impossible  that  'the increase  in B  [bonds]  implies  a one-to-one  increase  in 
the  asset  supply  .  . ."'  and  later  ".  . .  the  government  bonds  will  replace 
private  bonds  or other  assets."  In fact,  private  debt  issues  are not replaced 
because  of any  direct  budget-constraint  requirements,  but  rather  will  be 
crowded  out  if  the  public  debt  issue  leads  to an  excess  supply  of earning 
assets  (at  initial  interest  rates)  and  therefore  to  an  increase  in  interest 
rates.  An  excess  supply  results  if individuals  do  not  respond  to  the  debt COMMUNICATIONS  347 
issue by saving (in the form of government bonds) the full amount of the 
transfer payment  (tax cut).  The  one-to-one increase in saving (demand 
for bonds) arises if the future tax liabilities implied  by the government 
debt  are fully capitalized,  so  that  perceived wealth  is  unchanged  and 
individuals therefore maintain  the same level  of consumption demand. 
Hence, Buchanan's statement that ". . . this neglects the possible effects 
of the sale of bonds on displaced private borrowers" does not make sense. 
If government bonds are not perceived as net wealth, then the demand for 
bonds rises one-to-one with the supply, there is no change in interest rates, 
and no displaced private borrowers. 
The  basic analysis can  be  extended  to view  government  bonds and 
future tax liabilities as two elements in a larger household balance sheet 
with imperfect substitutability among the variety of assets and liabilities 
(because of differences in  characteristics of risk and  "liquidity,"  etc.). 
In  this context  the  demand  for bonds would  rise one-to-one  with  the 
supply (in the case of a "helicopter drop" of bonds) only if the bonds and 
the associated capitalized  tax liabilities were perfect substitutes.7 More 
generally,  one  could  consider  the  different risk and  liquidity  charac- 
teristics of bonds and  the  tax liabilities,  and also bring in  "imperfect" 
private capital markets (as I did in a preliminary way in Sections II-IV 
of my paper). The implications of these considerations for the net effect 
of public debt issue on aggregate demand hinge on such issues as whether 
the government or the private economy is more efficient at the margin in 
producing liquidity  services or carrying out  loans, and  on  how  closely 
(uncertain) individual  tax  liabilities  are correlated with  individual  in- 
comes. There is no presumption from this extended theoretical analysis 
that  bond-financed tax  reductions  (transfer payments)  would  increase 
aggregate demand. 
Buchanan briefly discusses empirical evidence on whether future tax 
obligations are capitalized.  He  cites  Feldstein's  (1974)  study  of  social 
security as evidence to the contrary. Feldstein's main conclusion (p. 920) 
is that the ". . . effect of social security is to reduce personal saving by 
half of what it otherwise would be." In fact, Feldstein's results (p. 917) 
show a significant effect of a  "social security wealth variable"  (which 
seems to measure primarily changes in the fraction of workers covered by 
social security and secondarily shifts in  age structure) on  consumption 
only when the years 1929-40 are added to the 1947-71 sample, suggesting 
that the variable may be operating principally as a dummy for the pre- 
1937 years for which it takes on a zero value.  Further, the effect of the 
social  security  variable  over  the  entire  sample  (1929-40,  1947-71)  is 
7  In the sense that individuals  were concerned  only with the difference  between the 
amount  of government  bonds and the amount of capitalized  tax liabilities  in their port- 
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insignificant  when  an  unemployment  variable  is included.8  Accordingly, 
Feldstein's  finding  that  social  security  has  drastically  reduced  saving  and 
capital  accumulation  must  be  regarded  as highly  tentative. 
Some  support  for the  view  that  future  taxes  are capitalized  is presented 
in  empirical  studies  of  consumption  and  saving  behavior  by  Tanner 
(1970),  Kochin  (1974),  and  David  and  Scadding  (1974). 
Finally,  Buchanan  (p.  340)  adds  the  weight  of his own  casual  observa- 
tion  to the  empirical  issue:  ". . . the  behavior  of legislators  seems  to offer 
indirect  evidence  against  the  capitalization  hypothesis.  Can  anyone  in the 
post-Keynesian  world  of  1975  seriously  question  the  proclivity  of  poli- 
ticians  to  expand  public  debt  in  preference  to  tax  increases?"  This 
hypothesis  may  be  a  bit  loose  to  submit  to  empirical  testing,  but  it  is 
hard  to  reconcile  it,  in  a  general  way,  with  the  post-World  War  II 
behavior  of the federal  government.  The  quantity  of U.S.  government  debt 
that  is  privately  held  (excluding  holdings  of  the  Federal  Reserve,  social 
security  trust  fund,  etc.)  was9  $204  billion  at  the  end  of  1947  and  $230 
billion  at  the  end  of  1970  implying  an  average  annual  growth  rate  of 
0.5  percent  per  year.  On  the  other  hand,  U.S.  government  tax  receipts 
(including  other  receipts  like  social  security  payments)  rose  from  $43 
billion  in  1947  to  $192  billion  in  1970  an  average  annual  growth  rate 
of  6.5  percent  per  year.  (If  federal  politicians  had  a  "proclivity  . . . to 
expand  public  debt  in preference  to tax increases"  over  this period,  it was 
more  than  matched  by  a  "declivity"  of the  public.)  Despite  the  modest 
growth  of privately  held  public  debt,  the  ratio  of federal  expenditures  to 
GNP  rose from  13 percent  in  1947 to 21 percent  in  1970. Hence,  the ready 
availability  of debt  finance  is apparently  not  a necessary  accompaniment 
to  increases  in  the  share  of  output  absorbed  by  the  federal  government. 
Since  1970  there  has  been  a  faster  growth  rate  of  public  debt  to  $271 
billion  at the  end  of  1974,  implying  a 4.1  percent  average  annual  growth 
rate from  1970 to  1974.  Over  this period,  taxes  rose to $291  billion,  imply- 
ing  a  10.4 percent  average  annual  growth  rate of taxes  from  1970 to  1974. 
Hence,  even  in the  most  recent  period,  taxes  grew  faster  than  the stock  of 
privately  held  federal  government  debt.  Further,  the  fraction  of  GNP 
accounted  for by federal  spending  was  almost  constant  from  1970 to  1974, 
suggesting  that  an  acceleration  of public  debt  is not  a sufficient  indicator 
of a rising  share  of government  spending  in  total  output." 
8 For further discussion of these results, see Upton  (1975). 
9 All data are from Council of Economic  Advisers, Economic  Report  of the  President,  1975 
and earlier issues. 
1O This note is a convenient  place to correct some typographical  errors in my original 
paper. The date references to Patinkin's book on pp.  1096, 1116, and 1117 should be 1965. 
On  p.  1099, the AO in equation  (3) should be AO. The  AO's that appear  two and eight 
lines below this equation  should be AO. COMMUNICATIONS  349 
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